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This paper examines the long-standing debate over the events that transpired during the late 
Ottoman Empire between local Armenians and their predominately Muslim neighbors as well as 
the government. The term, “Armenian Genocide” has been used often to describe these tragic 
events. My writing goes into depth regarding the background history of this term. I write about the 
narrative of what happened between the two major groups during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries as told by multiple different scholars. Narratives included are of Abdul Hamid II’s reign, 
the political parties created by Armenians in order for protest, the connections of the minority 
group with the Russians, as well as the deportations that took place afterward. It is also addressed 
here the definitions of the different terms including “genocide” that are unfortunately today used 
interchangeably. Here, comparisons are made between the main topic of Armenians and Turks, and 
other similar events throughout history like the Holocaust, Yugoslavian wars, and the Circassian 




I dedicate this paper to my parents, Mujgan and Mustafa Agardici. They have changed countries 
and continents to give me a better education. I owe all of my success until now and the success I 
will attain in the future to their long-standing support.  
  
vi  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………...1 
ABDUL HAMID’S REIGN…………………………………………………………………………1 
HAMIDIAN MASSACRES…………………………………………………………………………4 
HUNCHAK & DASHNAK PARTIES……………………………………………………………...7 





MCCARTHY’S NARRATION OF EVENTS………………………………………………..........19 
THE GREAT WAR………………………………………………………………………………...20 
THE YOUNG TURKS DURING THE WAR………………………………………………….….28 
DEPORTATIONS…………………………………………………………………………….……30 
DEPORTATIONS & COMPARISON WITH YUGOSLAVIA…………………………………...31 
WERE THE ARMENIANS VICTIMS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING OR GENOCIDE?..................33 
ROOT OF THE TERM, GENOCIDE……………………………………………………………...35 
COMPARISON WITH THE HOLOCAUST………………………………………………………38 
THE CIRCASSIAN GENOCIDE………………………………………………………………….39 
DADRIAN- TRIALS AFTER WWI……………………………………………………………….45 






The Armenian Genocide has been a topic of controversy for a century now. More and more 
countries are officially recognizing the events that transpired during World War I as what it is, a 
genocide. However, there are still a number of others that do not. One of them is Turkey, the 
successor of the events-perpetrator Ottoman Empire.  
In my thesis, I will be writing on the historical background of events that transpired 
between the two groups in conflict until and during the recognized date of genocide. I will be 
incorporating different perspectives from multiple sources in explaining the events. These events 
include first and foremost the misdeeds that the sultan committed over his subject populations, the 
creation of certain political parties set up for the intention of liberation, and the continuation of the 
ruling government afterward, among others. I will be writing on the different definitions of not just 
the term “genocide,” but other terms like “ethnic cleaning,” and “forced migrations.” In order to 
fully expand on the story of what happened to the Armenians, I will be comparing the narrative to 
that of other events throughout history: the Circassican Genocide, the Holocaust, and Yugolsavia’s 
breakup. I intend to write this paper with no bias although I myself am a Turk. I arrive at the details 
in an objective view and analyze through the mind of a scholar. 
 
ABDUL HAMID II’S REIGN 
As complex as the history of the Armenians in the late phases of the Ottoman Empire is, it 
is important to start from the beginning in order to give a meaningful transition between the order 
of events. An ideal place to start would be the beginning of Abdul Hamid II’s reign as sultan.  
 As a student of Turkish education, and one that observes Turkish politics through news 
outlets, I have noticed Abdul Hamid II being portrayed in one of two ways. There is the current 
Turkish government-portrayed highly religious and genius sultan who trusted not even his advisors, 
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and then there is the more Western picture of him as a bloody and vicious sultan (Rodogno 185). I 
will not go into detail about why the Turkish political party in power favors the sultan so much as 
that is a whole discussion in itself and does not benefit the trajectory of this paper. I will focus 
more on the latter and explain why the West refers to Abdul Hamid the way they do. 
Guenter Lewy specifically starts out his writing in analyzing the events leading up to the 
massacres of the Armenian peoples from the late 1870’s when the Russo-Turkish War took place. 
This period also coincided with the time when Abdul Hamid inherited the throne from his brother 
Murad V. According to the works of another scholar, İsmet Bozdağ, Abdul Hamid opposed this 
war with the Russians from the start. However it was too late by the time he became sultan and so 
fought a losing war for two years (42). 
During this time when the war was one year in, Lewy makes a point stating that the Russian 
army included many Armenians, those from both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Many of them 
from the Ottoman side served as guides for the Russian troops. Lewy elaborates on the reasoning 
behind this; by this time the pro-Russian sentiments toward liberating the Armenians within the 
Turkish empire and freeing them from the Turks’ maltreatment was well installed within the 
Armenians themselves. In taking into consideration the fact that the Ottoman government saw a 
theme of hope transpiring from one its minority groups based on the success of its enemy in war, 
and also that same group aided that same enemy in the war, raised doubts on issues like trust and 
reliability. Being known as “the most loyal” among all its subject people, the Armenians with this 
war undoubtedly transformed into the opposite, “a people suspected to be in league with foreign 
enemies was complete” (Lewy 14). 
This creation of mistrust towards the Armenian peoples did not just stay at the government 
level but extended to many throughout the empire, including the local Kurds and Circassians in the 
East. Therefore it is no surprise that when the war finally ended and the Russian troops pulled out 
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from the east, these local non-Christian groups, with the hatred instilled in them from what had 
transpired, started to pillage Armenian villages and lead thousands of Armenians to flee, eventually 
seek refuge in Russia (Lewy 27). 
The timeline of these actions also goes back to the same year that the war started, 1876, 
when Abdul Hamid proclaimed in the First Constitution that all nationalities be given equal 
treatment. Although this gave some hope to the minorities of the empire, the situation became even 
worse than before when two years later the sultan abolished this constitution. It may be argued 
through these actions that the only sultan to ever impose any kind of limited power to his role in 
government ruled with even more autocratic rule than of his predecessors in the next three decades 
he would stay in power (Lewy 12). 
During the two years that this constitution was in effect, the Ottoman Empire was in a 
losing war with the Russian Empire. When the Russo-Turkish war finally came to an end with a 
Russian victory in 1878, it resulted in the Turks having to sign the Treaty of Berlin, a modification 
of the previously signed Treaty of San Stefano. The new treaty read:  
“The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and 
reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to 
guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the 
steps taken to this effect to the powers, who will superintend their application” (Hurewitz 190) 
 This treaty was one of the, if not the very first time, that European Powers addressed a real 
concern for their fellow Christian allies that were in a Muslim-contolled land. Countries like 
France, Britain, and Russia made this issue a special concern. However, be as it may, it was just 
that (Lewy 23). 
 This treaty achieved nothing it intended to. Far from it, it actually increased the antagonistic 
relationship between the Turks and the Armenians. The measures raised expectations on the 
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Armenian side while they did nothing to truly implement the security they had promised for. This 
mandatory order imposed by foreign European powers onto the Ottoman Empire that the Turks had 
to report back and inform them of the reforms’ progress as well as the status of the Armenians’ 
safety was enough to anger the sultan. Abdul Hamid became increasingly frustrated with the 
growing interference of Western powers in his empire’s internal affairs. As a result, the Armenians 
provided a serious threat in the sultan’s mind, as the lands they were a part of constituted a 
significant section of the already shrinking empire. According to Lewy, Europe was in a game of 
dissolving the Ottoman Empire slowly but gradually, and they would use the Armenians as pawns 
in their struggle for dominance and power over the land. Lewy states that this fact was enough to 
propel the sultan into thinking the Armenians would use whatever necessary, including violence, in 
order to get what they wanted (24). 
 This threat that Abdul Hamid predicted became a reality some ten years later when in the 
1890’s the Armenians started demanding the implementation of reforms which were promised to 
them by the Berlin Treaty. Not taking these regulations seriously, and even flat out ignoring their 
demands, Abdul Hamid started a merciless mission towards the Armenians in which it led to what 
would be called the Hamidian Massacres (Akcam 36). 
 
HAMIDIAN MASSACRES 
 According to Lewy, by the 1890’s Russia’s involvement with the Armenian revolutionaries 
became apparent. As too was the czarist empire’s interest in eastern Anatolia. In 1891, Abdul 
Hamid took a bold step as a way of countering these threats. The sultan decreed the formation of 
Kurdish volunteer cavalry units. These Kurdish volunteers, that would be called the Hamidiye, 
would go on to consist of tens of thousands of men. The support they received from the highest 
power in their empire allowed them to maraud locals and peasants of all ethnicities, including other 
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Muslims. However, it was the Armenian peasant population that saw the most significant impact. 
These Hamidiye armed bandits would go on to terrorize the Armenian population for a number of 
years until around 1896 (Cleveland 119). 
Abdul Hamid did not hesitate to put down the many revolts throughout the empire that were 
being organized mostly by the two political entities of Hunchaks and Dashnaks. This paper will 
address these two parties later in depth. The way the sultan dealt with these revolts was with harsh 
methods, again implementing the Kurds’ numbers in some eastern regions where the government 
may have been shorthanded. The aftermath of such actions resulted in the deaths of approximately 
300,000 Armenians. News of these massacres undoubtedly reached governments of foreign powers 
like the United States, and many in Europe, hence the nickname of “Kizil Sultan,” or “Bloody 
Sultan” was given as a result (Lewy 30). 
 Going into more detail on the Hamidian Massacres, Taner Akcam defines this act of the 
sultan’s as having the goal of maintaining a strict imperial domain of the already declining empire, 
and reasserting a neo-Islamic state of living (44). This issue of maintaining a pan-Islamic and pan-
Turkish society will be discussed later in this paper as it was key to what had transpired during the 
CUP regime more than one decade later. 
Lewy makes a point of the sultan’s regime playing a role in all that transpired later when he 
describes the Armenians as being treated like second class citizens, meaning holding lower status 
and rights than their Muslim counterparts. They would pay special taxes, wear clothing that would 
easily distinguish them as Christians or Armenians, not be able to possess firearms, and more (11). 
Some of these regulations would be comparable to such examples like wearing the Star of David 
on the arms of the Jewish population during Nazi Germany’s regime among other things.  
 The sultan extended greater power over their Christian neighbors to the Kurdish population 
living in Eastern Anatolia in order to enforce minimizing the Armenians’ threat. The Kurd 
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chieftains would be responsible for collecting tributes from their victim Armenian neighbors. 
According to Lewy, when Armenian families would not be able to pay the mandatory taxes to their 
established “overlords,” the Kurds who were known to have a larger presence in most of these 
communities, would attack the villages of Armenians, steal their cattle among other resources, and 
even go so far as to abduct and possibly kill women and children (12). 
 The majority of the massacres took place within the three years spanning from 1894 to 
1896. According to Akcam, the issues facing the sultan in regards to the Armenian hostilities 
stemmed from the problems elsewhere. It was the “ongoing persecutions and hostilities of the 
Christian world” that gave way for Christians in the Muslim world to act the way they did. Akcam 
states, in the mind of the sultan, who was popularly known to be paranoid, these hostilities by yet 
another Christian ethnic group were a way of European powers gaining the power in “getting at 
[Ottomans’] most vital places” (Akcam 44). 
 The massacres were not solely a product of Abdul Hamid. Although the sultan had the 
power to oversee all public and internal matters, local governors, themselves victims of this 
perpetuated hatred, acted against the Armenian populations. Where governors had the duty of 
governing and protecting their subjected population, certain ones such as the authority figure in 
charge of Mus, did quite the opposite and incited violence and enraged even more his heavily 
Muslim populated civilians against the Armenians (Balfour 559).    
 From hearing of these acts, the Great Powers of Europe again tried their hand at the sultan. 
The future Triple Entente members in the Great War, Russia, France, and England, forced Abdul 
Hamid into signing a new reform package designed to improve the treatments and end the killings 
of its Armenian subjects. Arguably, these measures were set forth in a way of curtailing the 
sultan’s powers over his Muslim population. However, like the Berlin Treaty guidelines in the prior 
years, Abdul Hamid never fully implemented the Great Powers’ requests (Balakian 57). 
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Eventually, due to increasing international condemnation, the massacres dropped by the 
year 1897. By this time though, an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 Armenians had been killed 
(Akcam 42). Exact numbers have been difficult to determine, however according to Johannes 
Lepsius, a German missionary sent to the Ottoman Empire to collect data on the Armenian peoples, 
the lower end of this estimation was a result of the killings alone, and the higher end was a result of 
factoring in the deaths due to other reasons such as famine and disease. According to Lepsius, more 
than half a million Armenians were thrown into poverty as a result and around 2,500 villages of 
theirs had been destroyed. Hundreds of churches had either been desecrated or converted into 
Islamic institutions (Deringil 344). 
It may be argued that the turn of events in the late 19th century paved the way in which 
alliances were either made or destroyed in the early 20th. Neither France nor Russia were truly 
allies with the Turks during the majority of the 19th century and relations only went from bad to 
worse after all of these events transpired where the victims were of the same religion as them. 
However, the Ottoman Empire had severely weakened its relationship with Britain, who had aided 
the Turks in the Crimean War some three decades earlier as well as fought alongside them against 
Napoleon’s army in Egypt in the beginning of the century. 
 
HUNCHAK & DASHNAK PARTIES 
As a result of these actions where the sultan granted Kurds the power to mistreat 
Armenians, the latter group started creating ways to cope with the violence. In their struggle to let 
the Armenian people be heard, some revolutionaries began revolting. A large base of the operations 
that involved these revolts came from recently established political organizations such as the Social 
Democrat Hunchakian Party, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (otherwise known as 
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Dashnagzoutiun). Although these parties formed due to similar reasons, among which the most 
important was their shared view of anti-Turkism, their ideologies slightly differed.   
 The Hunchak party was founded some few years earlier around 1887 in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The party was formed by a group of Armenian college students who were influenced 
by Marxist ideologies. Their goal, in setting up the party, was to resurrect a socialist government 
within the historic Armenia, which would come to include their countrymen and lands from both 
the Ottoman and Russian empires as well as certain regions in the Caucasus (Lewy 17).  
 Members of the Hunchak Party wanted to advance the activities of revolution in Eastern 
Anatolia. Their manifesto was: “It is necessary to forcefully reshape, revolutionize the present 
social organization in Turkish Armenia, including inciting revolt” (McCarthy 42).  
 The Dashnak Party was founded in 1890, again by Armenian students. This political party 
was formed within a conference being held at Tiflis, in what is modern day Georgia. According to 
Lewy, the objective of the conference was to discuss and bring about the unification of all 
revolutionary forces within a single collect organization. Whereas the Hunchak Party originated 
from the idea of creating a socialist Armenian government, the Dashnak Party did so from first 
uniting the people who would have that same mindset (Lewy 17). While the Hunchak Party sought 
to form an independent Armenian state and the Dashnaksoutiun were more concerned about 
creating reforms within the framework of the empire that favored their compatriots, the goals of 
both parties were one and the same, to liberate their fellow Armenians (18).  
 More specific to the Hunchak Party’s goals, the demand for an autonomous Armenia was 
the ultimate solution that would satisfy the liberation movement. However much this idea sounded 
hopeful to the Armenians, it sounded that much more threatening to the Turks ruling over them 
though, “... as simply opening the wedge for complete separation and the breakup of the empire” 
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(Lewy 18). As if all of these mounting movements were not angering the Turkish government, the 
situation really inflamed when Europe started intervening in the Ottoman Empire’s internal affairs. 
 Such an example that Lewy lists is the British prime minister William Gladstone’s remarks. 
In receiving Gladstone’s sharp notes of criticism on how the Turks were managing the issue, 
figures like Abdul Hamid himself started becoming even more enraged at the situation. It came to a 
point that because of this level of foreign interference, the more patriotic Turks began seeing the 
Armenians in a collectivist light: disloyal subjects to the empire, and in league with outside powers 
whose mission was to slowly but gradually dismantle the Turkish lands (Lewy 20). 
There were revolts staged all over Eastern Anatolia including in Van, Zeytun, and Samsun. 
As a means of joining forces together, these activities organized by the Dashnaktsutyun were 
sponsored by Hunchak revolutionaries. McCarthy explains that the primary reason was not to gain 
immediate success and a direct land ownership against the all-powerful empire, but to give the 
Ottomans cause to retaliate (42). 
McCarthy explains through these incidents that acts like these were all part of a carefully 
designed plan by the Armenian revolutionaries, specifically the Hunchak Party. The goal was for 
revolts like these to occur and anger the Ottoman authorities in any way possible in order to 
provoke them into committing excessive retaliation. This would then draw the attention of their 
wanted Christian allies in Europe and the United States where news articles would be passed onto 
the public portraying the Turks in a barbarous light and gaining support for a possible intervention 
on their behalf.  
Lewy writes that these revolutionaries would be given commands to watch for the perfect 
opportunity and attack the Turks and Kurds when the time was right. The latter groups would then, 
acting in revenge, slaughter innocent Armenians with such barbarity that Russia would step in and 
act as a savior of the Armenian peoples. One such account of a missionary is told in Lewy’s work; 
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“It appears so to you [that this method is immoral], no doubt; but we Armenians have determined 
to be free. Europe listened to the Bulgarian horrors and made Bulgaria free. She will listen to our 
cry when it goes up in shrieks and blood of millions of women and children .... We are desperate. 
We shall do it” (22). 
Many events coordinated under the previously mentioned method occurred. In one case, 
Armenian nationals shot at mosque attendees in Erzurum killing a large number of Muslims, and 
afterward, Turkish nationals took their revenge by killing an even larger number of Armenian 
Christians (McCathy 244). In doing so, the organizers of the initial attack hoped that this news 
reached prominent potential allies in Europe and elsewhere in the form of how savage their Turkish 
neighbors were. Their plan was that in hearing about these inhumane acts conducted by the Turks, 
the allies would come to the aid of the victim Armenian minority and protect them at all costs, even 
to the point that if necessary, help them form independent Armenia (39). 
As examples like this occurred constantly, the outcome did not become what the Dashnak 
Party had expected. Although these events became heard loud and clear, European superpowers, 
like England and Russia, did not come to their aid because the issue of what to do with the 
Armenians’ land after the fact could not be agreed upon (McCarthy 148). 
Armenian revolutionaries, in wanting to create an apartheid state of Armenia within the 
borders of the Ottoman Empire, needed to gain control of certain provinces in eastern Anatolia 
where a significant Armenian population lived alongside Turks and Kurds. These provinces that 
came to be known as the “Six Vilayets” included Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Diyarbakir, 
Mamuret-ul Aziz, and Bitlis. Together they formed the entire eastern front reaching the Russian 
and the Persian empires. Justin McCarthy analyzes this method from the perspective of the Turks 
in stating however that were this apartheid state to form successfully, the group in power would 
have to get rid of the majority in some way as a way of minimizing the threat (265). According to 
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the historian, Armenian imperial subjects thus gave the Ottoman government good reason to think 
the lives of Turkish subjects in the east were in danger. Certain ideologies of the aforementioned 
political parties supporting the pro-Armenian movement were also set out to more strictly enforce 
this kind of mindset. 
Lewy mentions a historian, William Langer, whose thesis on the act of provocation helps 
understand the turn of events. Langer argues that all of these organized incidents created by the 
Armenian revolutionaries to “bring about inhuman reprisals, and to provoke the intervention of the 
powers” was a complete failure because the Europeans, whom they relied on heavily, did not 
deliver. Europeans never followed through with their treaty requests long enough for there to be 
lasting reforms created by the Ottoman government. “The net result was that thousands of innocent 
Armenians lost their lives, and there was no real gain to be shown” (Langer 154).  
Lewy analyzes that in spite of all of these plans to provoke the Turks, what the Turks did in 
retaliation had no place. Blatantly, the author suggests that these plans were just an excuse for the 
Ottoman Muslims and that the authorities would have been forthcoming with brutal acts even in 
their absence. As long as there were dreams of a free Armenia escalating within the borders of the 
Turkish empire, Ottoman authorities saw that there would be no other way to deal with its 
subjected people other than violence. 
 
KATCHAZNOUNI FOUNDER OF DASHNAKS 
As a primary source I add to my paper the work of Hovhannes Katchaznouni, a prominent 
revolutionary as well as the first prime minister of the Republic of Armenia in 1918. The reason I 
chose Katchaznouni and not the primary source that of a regular Armenian citizen is because I 
believe that what Katchaznouni had to write would carry more academic importance. It is to be 
argued I believe that the narratives of witnesses to a world event account for very little. There were, 
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as historians have repeatedly stated, many people who suffered at the hands of their enemies on 
both sides. When going into detail about what and how they suffered, the stories would be very 
similar to each other, whether it would be an Armenian family who got attacked at the hands of 
Turkish troops or a Muslim family by revolutionary bandits.  
 Katchaznouni experienced first hand the conflict that arose between the two groups. He was 
one of the founding members of the Dashnak Party whose sole purpose of setting up the 
organization was to help his fellow Armenians in liberation from Ottoman rule. Although his work 
does not excuse the fact that there was a genocide done to the Armenians, it does argue that these 
Armenian revolutionaries were indeed aiding Russia among other things and thus were not entirely 
innocent.  
 The prime minister and founding father of the ARF Dashnaks writes in a chronological 
order of the events that transpired in the years leading up to the war until the Turks won back their 
independence in 1923. Although I use this work as a reference in explaining the genocide, most of 
what Katchaznouni writes focuses on what happens after the Great War. He writes on topics such 
as the Transcaucasian Republic set up by the inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia 
(possibly Tatarstan), and later the Bolshevik regime that transformed Armenia’s government into 
that of a state of Soviet Russia. I will not be going into these topics unless there are details within 
them that aid in the discussion of the Turks-Armenians relationship. 
 Katchaznouni makes it clear that there was a shared ideology of the revolutionaries that 
hoped for a Tsarist Russia intervention. He however also criticises himself and his party’s ideology 
(as a way of foreshadowing the telling of later events) by stating that there was no positive basis of 
fact to think this way. Russia granting the Armenians a “more-or-less” broad self-government in 
their eastern vilayets and the Caucasus, and liberating them from Turkish rule, was always nothing 
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more than a dream. The loyalty that Katchaznouni’s party would give Russia was intended to be 
paid back in this way (3).  
 
PERINCEK’S ANALYSIS 
 One of the more significant statements that the former prime minister makes revolves 
around Turkey being in a war with the Armenian revolutionaries who were backed by imperialist 
powers that the former was also fighting. In Mehmet Perincek’s review of this work, the Turkish 
historian explains in more detail why such imperialist powers gave such importance to small ethnic 
groups like that of the Armenians. He gives an example of one of the better known imperialist 
powers of today’s world, the United States of America. Perincek writes that the present strategy of 
the US is to bestow upon these small ethnic groups special missions worked to later divide the 
country that they are a part of. Such bloody outcomes of tactics like these have resulted in, and 
according to the historian, still result in imperial powers being able to control these lands at a much 
more efficient level regarding resources and trade routes (Katchaznouni 11).   
 Perincek argues that this same concept emerged during the years surrounding the Great War 
and led the great imperial powers of back then, Britain and Russia mostly, to meddle in the 
Ottoman Empire’s internal affairs. As stated previously, the likes of Britain and other Western 
states used their power to exploit the crimes they saw in the Turkish empire. Russia on the other 
hand arguably worked alongside the Armenians (Katchaznouni 12). As a result of all of this 
interference by the Western powers, a topic we saw previously that Abdul Hamid earlier came to 
despise, the Ottoman Empire did break up and stayed at the hands of its victors for a few years; the 
British controlled the northwest, Greeks the western coast, the Italians the southern coast, the 




I took my inspiration from Guenter Lewy in focusing my research on the events that 
transpired. Much like him, I try not to stay on labels too much as I believe they tell a very black 
and white narrative. My goal is to fill in the grey area as well. This is not to say that I do not give 
any importance to labels whatsoever. I will come to later in this paper the root of the word for 
genocide as well as go in depth with similar terms, but until then I will show the story, and as best 
to my ability, in a neutral point of view. 
 
NATIONALISM  
As we have seen in the history of the Holocaust, there was a powerful ideology of pro-
Germanism. This theme itself made it so that different groups not belonging to the “Aryan Race” 
were discriminated against. The same ideology could arguably apply to that of Talaat Pasha’s 
plans. Nationalism was among the top priorities for the Minister of the Interior as he wanted the 
Ottoman Empire to adopt a policy of what scholars call “Turkification” (Whitehorn 258). Although 
the “Aryan Race” cannot apply to Turks as the term was meant more specifically for Indo-
European language speakers, a similar philosophy was shared, one involving the Turkic language 
speakers, Turkish being the most popular among them.  
This extreme nationalism is argued to have been possibly influenced by the poems of Ziya 
Gokalp and others like him. Gokalp was an Ottoman poet during the Young Turks regime 
renowned for his advocacy of Turkish nationalism and negation of Ottomanism. It is argued that 
through his works he promoted the Turkish language and culture to all citizens within the empire. 
Thus he found all non-Turkish citizens to be of a foreign body and not fitting to Turkism, One such 
body that one could think of in reading his works were the Armenians.  
Guenter Lewy discusses the meaning of one of his more popular poems in his writing. He 
references the last stanza of “Turan” in which he states that Gökalp declared the fatherland of the 
15  
Turks was not Turkey but “a vast and eternal land: Turan (36). To him, “Turan” represents the area 
that lies east of modern-day Turkey that stretches towards Central Asia. These lands are where the 
poet believed the very first Turks had originated from. From the time of the Gokturks in the First 
Turkic Khaganate to the outskirts of the later Turkish empires like the Seljuks and Timurids, the 
Steppe as it is commonly called, was an important piece of land in defining Turks’ culture. The 
word Gokalp chose to title his work symbolizes the cultural unity of his nationality. Gokalp wrote 
in his book, The Principles of Turkism, that this stretch of land, that had included the former 
Armenian Kingdom, was “the great fatherland of all Turks, and that this fact would again be a 
reality in the future.” To him, this sense of cultural unity was vital in achieving another form of 
unity in the empire, a political one (Lewy 42). 
“The Turkish nation was to be based on ‘a sharing of education and culture,’ not on a racial 
or ethnic group. The Ottomans, by contrast, had traveled ‘the road of imperialism,’ which was so 
detrimental to Turkish culture and life” (Lewy 42).  According to Lewy, works such as his poem, 
“Turan,” brought about much controversy in his philosophy and even made scholars believe that he 
was outright racist. This idea of his extreme belief of Turanism went so far that it is argued he 
brought upon the genocide and gave the idea to those who contructed the event, such as Talaat 
Pasha.  
Lewy argues against this claim by stating that Gokalp’s philosophy of Turkism and 
Turanism revolved more around the spreading of the Turkish culture and language. It was merely a 
show of pride of one’s nationality in an exaggerated mode, not a plea to expand the empire to 
encompass more groups of people and convert them. In Gokalp’s mind, that would itself negate the 
whole process of Turanism. Lewy states that Gokalp took his inspiration from one of the founding 
figures of sociology, Emille Durkheim, in that this form of shared cultural identity created “the 
basis for social solidarity” (42).  
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 There is a debate of whether or not these poems fall in the category of extreme nationalism 
or extreme patriotism. All sides can argue about what Gokalp’s poems really represented and what 
their objectives were, however it can be fair to say that anyone reading it, especially at the 
government level, may have taken the meaning in a different direction and acted on it. 
 In order to analyze for myself and not solely rely on the analyses of others, I researched 
Gokalp’s poem for myself and translated it to the best of my ability. I used my knowledge of the 
Turkish language as a native speaker but on words and phrases I was not familiar with, I translated 
them from Ottoman to either English or Turkish through dictionaries online. I also took into 
consideration that some meanings might have changed naturally throughout the course of a century 
and so I acquired the wisdom and experience of some of the more elderly folk I know. 
The following is the translation I was able to produce from Ziya Gokalp’s Turkish and 
Latin alphabetized poem…  
Turan 
Nabızlarımda vuran duygular ki tarihin. The emotions that my heart beats for are that of history.   
Birer derin sesidir, ben sahifelerde değil. They are of deep voices within, not from papers. 
Güzide, şanlı, necip ırkımın uzak ve yakın.The unique, honorable, knowledgeable, race of mine so 
far and near. 
Bütün zaferlerini kalbimin tanininde. All victories cherished at the bottom of my heart. 
Nabızlarımda okur, anlar, eylerim tebcil. In my heart it reads, it understands the honor this 
produces. 
…  
Sahifelerde değil, çünkü Atilla, Cengiz.   They are not in papers from Attila and Genghis. 
Zaferle ırkımın tetviç eden bu nasiyeler.  With their victories did they crown my race these figures. 
O tozlu çerçevelerde, o iftira amiz. Those dusty frames, those about slander. 
17  
Muhit içinde görünmekte kirli, şermende. In society, looking dirty, ashamed. 
Fakat şerefle numayan Sezar ve İskender!However with honor appearing bright like Caesar and 
Alexander! 
…  
Nabızlarımda evet, çünkü ilm için müphem. In my heart yes, because for knowledge it is unknown 
Kalan Oğuz Han'ı kalbim tanır tamamiyle.  My heart recognizes in its entirety the produced Oghuz 
Khan. 
Damarlarımda yaşar şan-ü ihtişamiyle.  In my veins does he live with his undisputed splendor. 
Oğuz Han, işte budur gönlümü eden mülhem. Oghuz Khan, it is he who inspires my heart and soul. 
…  
Vatan ne Türkiyedir Türklere, ne Türkistan. The homeland is neither Turkey for Turks nor 
Turkistan. 




Ben Kiernan argues this view shared by the minister. He writes that in a conference in 
1910, held by the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress, among which Talaat 
Pasha was a part of, the party came to a conclusion to change its policy. It was concluded that this 
step of Turkification and/or Pan-Islam would be the step moving forward. According to Kiernan, 
the conference touched on keynotes of how the empire was no longer able to maintain the equality 
of its Muslim and non-Muslim populations due to all of the conflicts surrounding them from 
minority groups throughout the land. Talaat Pasha, a leading advocate of this policy change stated; 
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“there can be no question of equality, until we have succeeded in our task of ottomanizing the 
Empire." (Rae, 153) 
Did the chicken come first or the egg? Did the Armenians revolt as a result of the Turkish 
government’s actions against them or did they revolt which then stirred these actions? Claims 
mentioned here shed a lot more light on answering questions like these. However, both sides have 
valid points. Advocates of genocide deniers such as historian Justin McCarthy more or less go 
through a very similar if not identical narrative; it was the Armenians who revolted throughout the 
empire, set mosques ablaze and other places killing innocent Muslim civilians, and joining the 
Russian ranks when the Turks were already pushed to their limit. Advocates of genocide accepters 
do not deny some of these facts, such as the act of allying with Russia, although the amount is 
argued, but put the blame in such recurring figures like Abdul Hamid II and Talaat Pasha, or in 
events that transpired during those times such as the rise to power of the Young Turks’ CUP 
regime.    
Although the Young Turks were the political movement that dethroned Abdul Hamid II, the 
sultan responsible for so many Armenian deaths, they came to hold the same actions as its 
predecessor ruler in the issue of discriminating against Christian minorities. This ruling party did 
not start out its agenda with the plan of doing what it did in the coming years to the Armenians. 
Once the Young Turks divided and two different factions formed, one of which was the CUP, that 
is when conflicts arose. The CUP was created on the very basis of Turkish nationalism and pro-
centralization while the Freedom and Accord Party that the former overthrew in a violent coup was 
more liberal and focused on the different groups living together in harmony within the empire 
(Alkan 50).  
According to Mary C. Wilson, with the rise of the CUP, this more radical wing regime 
enacted various Turkification policies, policies that would step by step lead to a general sense of 
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the approach to the Armenian Genocide. The way this topic is taught in Turkey, as well as how I 
personally was taught this topic, has gained a controversial reaction. This is of course depending on 
which side of the argument one presides over.  
 
MCCARTHY’S NARRATION OF EVENTS 
Although the history is much more complex, Justin McCarthy writes in a way that leads the 
reader to think the neglect from European powers directly resulted in the Armenians finding a new 
and more direct approach in achieving their goals. This is where McCarthy dives in in explaining 
how the turn of World War I impacted the Armenians’ case.  
Jay Winter writes that the Armenian Genocide recognizers tend to focus on the conflicts 
that arose between the Armenians and the Turks in the few decades leading up to the genocide 
recognized date of 1915. According to the author, there is almost always a tendency of omitting the 
narrative on the Armenians and Russians collaboration during the war. Winter defends this notion 
by stating that the Turks simply assumed that the Armenians were secretly aiding the Russians. A 
controversial statement like this is one of the biggest topics that defines the whole issue of the 
Armenian Genocide. Authors defending the Turkish side have rebutted this statement and have 
shown clear signs of an Armenian presence backing the Russian military (Winter 13).  
McCarthy begins with explaining the initial efforts of Armenians forming a bond with the 
Ottomans’ next door enemy, Russia. The Dashnaks would start smuggling weapons as well as 
soldiers from Russia into the Ottoman Empire, specifically the city of Van and the surrounding 
areas. These smuggling activities were on such large scales that on one occasion, there were found 
to be two thousand weapons of all sorts hidden in Van (McCarthy 45).  
Although there were high volumes of weapons at the Armenians’ disposal, there was no 
chance of them pulling off a victory by themselves without the aid of foreign powers. In the 
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territories they claimed themselves, Muslims (mostly Turks and Kurds) had outnumbered 
Armenians significantly (McCarthy 81). The Armenian minority knew that their revolution would 
only be successful at a time when the Ottomans were occupied with other necessities, such as the 
big one, war. The Ottomans would have had to be fighting the Russians or elsewhere so that that 
ratio would more or so balance out in favor of the Armenians in order to give them a fighting 
chance.  
Winter comes back to the conflict in Van specifically in stating that the governor of the 
province in the time of the war, Djevdet Bey, had requested a total of 4,000 Armenian men to serve 
in the Turkish army in addition to its Turkish soldiers. Winter analyzes that this act by the governor 
was a means of leaving the Armenians in Van defenseless. By creating this logic, Winter agrees 
that the Armenian population chose the right decision by refusing to serve (14). To an outsider 
point of view, this refusal may have either, as Winter argues, been the safe call seeing that in the 
future, local Muslims would attack them here, or further escalated tensions between the group and 
the government. 
The argument can be made clearly in the Turkish side that because the Armenians did not 
participate in defending the empire that they were a part of, they were not subjected to the same 
equal treatments as the Muslim population who had participated. Again however, contradicting this 
statement, it can be shown from Abdul Hamid’s time that Armenians were considered second class 
citizens well before the Great War started. Whether they chose to do the same thing some 40 years 
prior during the Russo-Turkish War was a cause or a result of this is argued. It is a matter of the 
chronology of tensions between the two groups that one may be certain whether or not participation 
in the war really amounted to much. 
 
THE GREAT WAR 
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At the start of the Great War, tensions escalated between the minority and majority groups 
of Eastern Anatolia due to a number of reasons. Before the Ottoman Empire even officially entered 
the war on the side of the Central Powers, Turkish military recruiters made note of not being able 
to find any willing to fight Armenian young men in the eastern part of the empire’s lands. These 
men had been given no choice but to serve in the Ottoman army to fight against what they had 
previously hoped to be their allies. However instead, they did not do this, and ran to Russia in order 
to enroll in the Tsardom’s army. This way they would not be fighting alongside the Turks, but 
fighting against them. A large percentage of the ones who had not done this stayed in their local 
towns spread the East and organized anti-Muslim (encapsulating anti-Turkish and Kurdish) rants. 
These were not just one or two Armenians but a significant enough population to cause a threat. 
Due to the overall picture of all these events going on with the Ottoman government being aware of 
them as well, it is not surprising to learn that the public portrayal of Armenians worsened even 
further (McCarthy 187). 
To say that the Ottomans were biting off more than they could chew would be an 
understatement. Aside from the interior Armenian threat, the Ottomans had to fight the Russians 
not on one but two fronts. There was the original Northeast front and now, ever since Russia 
occupied western Persia, the Southeast front.  
In addition to aiding the Russian army by fighting in it, Armenian nationals sabotaged the 
Turkish army in more ways than one. One way in which this happened was through the use of 
communication. According to McCarthy, Russia had some power over their western neighbor and 
so used it in prohibiting the Ottoman Empire from building any more railroads. As a result, the 
entire eastern front for the Turks was down to one road leading to Erzurum and another one to Van. 
There was no other means of major transportation. As historians of the war and strategists of 
armies would agree, there needs to be some form of secure connection between the different fronts 
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so that soldiers as well as other existential elements can be moved from one place to another in the 
flow of the fighting. With no ways of rail transit, the Ottoman army was dependent on telegraph 
methods. The main telegraph lines would be in crucial locations connecting such cities like 
Erzurum and Van. For the Ottoman army, this kind of communication became an issue when 
Armenian guerilla bands interfered, and cut those wires. They cut them so often that the Ottoman 
army had to send whole divisions of soldiers from their fronts to protect those lines (McCarthy 
178). 
A crucial region to be witness to these sabotage efforts was Sivas/Sebinkarahisar. Sivas, 
due to its roads, was essential to the supply of the main Ottoman army on the Russian border. If 
you wanted to supply the Ottoman army, you had to go through that territory. If you wanted to get 
your wounded back to hospitals, you had to go through that territory. And if you wanted to damage 
the Ottoman war effort, that is where you would raid and cut the lines. McCarthy, after having 
explained all of these details, concludes that the Ottomans were left no choice but to defend 
themselves from all sides, east and west, exterior and even interior (217). 
One might wonder why among all places, Armenians focused a large chunk of their revolts 
in Sivas and not continued more on Van. There was an overwhelming difference in the amount of 
Muslims compared to Armenians. Van would have been a much wiser option if basing it off of the 
numbers alone. Sivas contained an 81% Muslim population whereas that number was 61% for Van 
(McCarthy 149). The reason however for choosing Sivas was so that the rebels could help the 
Russian army against the Ottomans and later the Russians could aid them back. According to 
McCarthy, there would be a collective Armenian guerilla set up behind Ottoman lines in the 
Eastern front, trapping their enemies between them and the Russians (217). 
Going more in depth about the lines, McCarthy lists three significant regions outside of 
Sivas that were witness to these kinds of attacks: Havasur, Yavas, and Karchikan. They were 
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significant not in that they carried a major population but because they were themselves those very 
roads and telegraph lines that connected cities like Van to the rest of the empire. The rebels were 
active in cutting the telegraph lines due to its geographic location that permitted it. These roads 
went through dangerous mountains where guerillas could fight back and forth, cut all of the supply 
lines, and ambush the people going through. When the Ottomans had lost their battles, they needed 
these routes to retreat. As one might expect, these rebels would make it extremely difficult for them 
to do so. There were in fact so many slaughters happening in these roads, that it became one of the 
key issues of the Eastern front. The Ottoman army assigned soldiers to protect these roads against 
guerillas. Men who should have been fighting at the battle front were instead defending 
passageways and thus this method depleted the Ottomans’ numbers against the Russians 
(McCarthy 193-202). 
There has been much speculation that this was the main reason why the Ottomans lost the 
war so easily. Although this is an exaggeration, no one can argue how much damage these rebels 
did to the Ottomans’ cause. The Battle of Dilman was a major blow to the Turks at the hands of the 
Russians because more than 6,000 Ottoman troops were busy fighting rebels in Van instead of 
defending their land at the front. This loss at Dilman resulted in Russia being able to break through 
Ottoman lines finally and capturing Eastern Anatolia (McCarthy 212). 
In terms of telegraph lines, if the Ottoman government was not able to use them as a means 
of communication due to these impending guerilla attacks, the only other way to get things done 
and communicate with the Third Ottoman Army as well as the senate would be to send these 
telegraph lines to the south. They would be sent through Bashkali to Neri where they would be 
given to on-horse and on-foot messengers. They would deliver it to somewhere that it could be sent 
through telegraph once again, all the way down to Baghdad and then up from there to Istanbul 
(McCarthy 217). Basically, these telegraph lines, instead of going in a straight line and in a time-
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efficient manner, would make a big and costly “U” on the map. This of course drastically slowed 
down all communication. 
Yet another example of this took place in Adana. This theme of choosing places based on 
very specific advantages continued. McCarthy explicitly states that Adana yet again was not the 
most strategically appropriate place for Armenians to revolt. However, where it was not strategic 
for rebellion, it was so for geographical purposes. Adana contained railway lines that connected 
Anatolia to the empire’s more outskirt states like Palestine and Iraq. The issue was though, that 
these railways had yet to be completed in two areas within Adana, one of which was named 
Pozanti. In a situation like Pozanti, Ottomans would have to take their equipment off the trains, 
move them by oxcart, and load them onto other trains. The attacks that occurred here thus disrupted 
the flow of these transactions within the empire and more or less helped the cause of the Allied 
Powers (178). 
According to McCarthy, helping the Allies succeed was a crucial mission for the Armenian 
revolutionaries in liberating Armenia. When the war had begun, the revolutionaries had offered to 
help fight alongside the British just as they had offered to Russia. These revolutionaries had tens of 
thousands of men willing to fight in the region but were not able to without some help due to their 
lack of weapons. They had requested from the British that the Royal Navy land in Adana, 
Iskenderun specifically, so that they could aid in their attack once they received their weapons 
supply, further destroy Ottoman communications in such a strategic location, and quite simply cut 
the empire in half, Northwestern Anatolia and the Balkans in one, and the Southeastern Levant in 
the other. This way, success in the battles of the Levant would be much more easily attainable. 
Although a very well thought of plan and one that would potentially benefit the British, the Royal 
Navy did not land on Adana. The British, led by Major Winston Churchill, rejected this idea based 
on its plan elsewhere. The Royal Navy would focus its heavy attack to the West in the Dardanelles 
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Strait. Based on my knowledge of the battle between the two groups, I analyze that if the British 
were to take the route offered to them by the Armenian revolutionaries, they would have had a 
much quicker and casualty-saving victory in the south rather than a long fought and costly loss at 
Gallipoli, a loss that prevented them from sailing to Istanbul (McCarthy 29:00-30:00). 
This example was one of the rare ones that McCarthy showed a collaborative effort 
between the Armenians and the British. I wanted to incorporate this here in order to show one 
argument of the Turkish side and what lengths they saw the revolutionaries would go to in order to 
help the Ottomans lose the war. Coming back however to his main focus on the East, the region of 
Saray saw many Armenian revolts. Their population was low, but they had collected there coming 
from all over. There were attacks on the Ottoman army that was defending against the Russians.  
In Bashkali, McCarthy illustrates in a very black and white perspective the Armenian rebels 
killing every resident regardless of their gender or age. McCarthy though, however much he shows 
Armenians in a barbaric light, also makes them out to be cowards. He states that these attacks, so 
heinous in nature that one would rightfully anticipate consequences as a result, were not carried out 
without the guaranteed security that the Russians provided for the rebels. When the Russians were 
in control of the area, that is when these events occurred. When the Russians had to retreat, so too 
did these perpetrators (70). McCarthy quite clearly labels these rebels as not nationals trying to 
defend their land anymore but as agents and spies being used by foreign invaders.  
Among the many events that transpired in Van, there was an invasion by the rebels, similar 
in nature to that of Bashkali. The rebels had started a mass revolt and took a hold of the whole city 
as a result. Aside from a small part of the city that McCarthy does not go more in detail about, the 
city of Van was in the hands of the Armenians who had ransacked, destroyed government 
buildings, killed those who stood in their way, and waited for the Russians to arrive so that they 
could give them the keys to the city (216). 
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All of this help to the Russians came with the hope that the Russian Empire would grant 
Armenians in the Ottoman lands an independent Armenia. McCarthy blatantly states that “Russia 
wanted to use the Armenians and the Armenians were perfectly willing to be used” (52:00-53:00). 
This of course is a very one-sided and opinionated statement that amounts to very little in scholarly 
debate. However, the reason he argues such a controversial statement stems from his knowledge of 
the aftermath when Russia in fact does not deliver on its word to the Armenian people. When all 
was said and done, the lands of the former Kingdom of Armenia were devastated by the war that a 
new nation could have been easily built even if in a short time period. The necessary seed to create 
all this however was prevented by Russia’s turn of events. According to McCarthy, Russia would 
not let the Armenians go back to their homeland. When I look at this topic in more detail later on in 
this paper, I realize that this issue was not as black and white as the historian makes it out to be. 
The truth behind this, very briefly, is that Armenia does in fact get their homeland but due to the 
circumstances surrounding them in the rest of Transcaucasia and the Bolshevik Revolution, it is 
very short-lived. This paper will address this topic in depth regarding Katchaznouni’s work.    
Where up until now my writing on McCarthy’s works were more so based on how a certain 
historian analyzed the events and which perspective he chose to look at them from. The 
Armenians’ efforts in aiding the enemy has been a topic that has either been used to hive reason to 
the later turn of events or has not been used in saying that the Ottomans had no valid reason for the 
genoicide. It is however part of the Great War’s and the Armenian Genocide’s history. It only 
differs in how historians go through that history with their own unique methods. Where these 
methods are used for the case of telling the events and themes of the war, it is not for telling the 
numbers associated with the Armenians’ deaths during these years. This hot issue of exactly how 
many and by whose hand these innocent Armenians died has completely differed from one expert 
to the next. 
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McCarthy writes that the Russians were more involved in the deaths of these Armenians 
than we thought. None of those Armenians who went up north after the eastern defeats of the 
Ottomans found the fate they were hoping for. According to McCarthy, around half of these 
migrants died earlier through starvation or disease. The Russians, in addition to not allowing them 
to go back to their homelands, also prohibited them from growing any crops and refused to provide 
any food as a possible solution (52:30-53:30). 
Most of the Armenians who had not traveled up north were relocated by the Ottoman 
government. The destination of these relocations were certain regions throughout the Levant. 
McCarthy validates the reason for this in writing that the Ottomans moved them because they 
justifiably feared them after all of what they witnessed during the war. The Armenians, which at 
the time were hard to distinguish regarding which were revolutionaries and which were innocent 
lives caught in the net, were all seen as one big threat. In the eyes of the Ottoman government, all 
of them were agents of Russia and had slaughtered thousands of Muslims. Relocating them was the 
most cost-efficient way in which the Ottomans were going to handle this matter. The logic was 
this: sacrifice the undetectable innocent Armenian lives so that this act would cut the Ottoman 
losses tremendously, not just soldiers but civilians as well. He basically portrays to the reader that 
this kind of mass relocation was justified through multiple reasons, especially during wartime. He 
also states that the Armenians relocated to the southern regions of the empire suffered about a 20% 
mortality rate, again due to starvation and disease, as opposed to around a 50% rate for those who 
went north with the Russians (246, 257). 
These numbers and percentages are always highly discussed but even the 20% of the deaths 
among a population of hundreds of thousands or even millions that McCarthy mentions do not 
excuse the Ottoman Empire for its misdeed. Thousands of people had died due to some factor that 
was either taken into account by the empire and not done anything about or happened due to 
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mistake, most of whom were statistically innocent and just being part of the minority group at the 
wrong time. McCarthy justifies throughout these aspects that both Armenians and Muslims were 
killed in this war, both groups had also died from harsh conditions, and so this was not a genocide 
but quite simply war. 
McCarthy leaves in the mind of his reader that the Ottomans were unofficially at war with 
the Armenians. There was at the time no “Armenia” to have officially been at war with. According 
to his logic, a group that aids one’s enemy becomes the enemy themselves. This is the narrative 
that students in Turkey, including myself, are all too familiar with. This reasoning of how the time 
of war justified the empire’s actions are taught throughout the country in modern times and why 
there is such a strong resentment of ever labeling the event as genocide (Chouldjian). 
While the Armenian rebels were by no means innocent, what had transpired onto the people 
they were fighting for was inhumane. It is no question that the Ottoman Empire, no matter how 
they might have justified their actions, and no matter how scholars like McCarthy blame the 
opposing side, committed the first genocide of the 20th century. 
 
THE YOUNG TURKS DURING THE WAR 
Hans-Lukas Kieser writes that these accusations surrounding the Armenians’ aid to the 
Russian army only accounted for the minority of their population. He writes that most of the 
Armenian population had wished for a swift Ottoman victory over their enemies. These would be 
shown in Armenian churches where there would be prayers concerning the Ottomans’ success 
(188). This issue has been debated back and forth between historians as I have written whether or 
not the significant percentage of the Armenian population did intend to help bring the defeat of the 
Ottomans or quite the opposite, as Kieser states, hope for them winning the war. A more concrete 
argument however can be made about the relationship between such Armenians that organized 
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revolts, such as the aforementioned Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and the newly assembled 
power of the CUP. These groups had worked together previously in their attempt to overthrow 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II and reinstall the constitutional monarchy that he had promised. However, 
after what they did led to a success and the coup of 1913 resulted in the CUP gaining more power, 
this view started growing that Armenians would be seen more as a fifth column (a group within a 
country who are sympathetic to that country’s enemy) and thus eventually betray the Ottoman 
Empire (Balakian 168). 
Although the Armenians had viewed the Young Turks as allies and supporters of their 
cause at first, the relationship quickly deteriorated as a result of an uncertainty in the CUP of 
whether or not the Armenians could be trusted and, according to experts, that emerging sense of 
extreme nationalism we saw earlier when comparing to the Nazi Party.  
Taner Akcam states that with the newly seized power, the “Three Pashas,” which consisted 
of Talaat, Minister of the Interior, Enver, Minister of War, and Cemal, Minister of the Navy, 
ordered the deportation of roughly one million Armenians. Many regard the imprisonment of 
Armenian revolutionary leaders in Istanbul as the start of the genocide, and this act of mass 
deportations as the continuation, or possible end of it. The author adds that this action was not just 
specific to only Armenians living in the empire but to other Christians as well. Such a group that 
almost endured the same fate as their eastern Christian counterparts were the Greeks. Akcam writes 
that the reason the Ottoman Triumvirate of the Three Pashas were not able to deport the Greeks in 
the same way that they were able to with the Armenians and had their power limited was due to 
German pressure. The Germans were the main equipment and arms supplier of the Turks during 





This popular belief linking the Armenians to a fifth column status became the excuse for the 
Triumvirate to justify their orders on the deporations. These deportations were rounded up from 
such places like Bitlis, Erzurum, and Mus, to be transferred to more southern and western regions 
within the empire, places that were as far away as possible from the immediate threat of the eastern 
front with Russia. According to Schaller and Zimmerer, some 300,000 Armenians were deported to 
Urfa in the south and Marash and later Konya in the west. One could make the argument that Urfa, 
among these provinces was in fact the Armenians’ ancestral lands stretching from the time of the 
Armenian Kingdom. However, splitting up the groups and sending only part of the deportees to 
Urfa, where it would still have a heavy Muslim population, was more so intended to either as the 
Turkish side would have it, get them away from Russian threat, or as the opposing side would 
argue, disperse the group so that they could not unite. By the end of the war, more than a million 
Armenians had been deported and dispersed into more inland regions of the empire, and 
unfortunately, around half of them died on the trips due to factors like hypothermia, starvation, or 
bandit attacks (8). 
These bandit attacks were a large part of the product of Talaat Pasha. The pasha had done 
similarly to what his predecessor sultan did with the recruitment of the Kurds. Talaat promised all 
prisoners within the empire who were convicted of a wide range of crimes including the most 
haneous ones like rape, murder, and robbery, their freedom if they agreed to join a special 
organization meant for looting the properties of the Armenian peoples and killing them (Shaw & 
Shaw 312). 
Although I have talked mostly about Talaat’s misdeeds that resulted in the removal of 
hundreds of thousands to millions of Christian lives, it would not be fair to omit Enver out of the 
equation. Although the latter pasha was more involved in matters of war instead of internal affairs 
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like his counterpart, Enver still left his mark on the situation. Enver Pasha had strategically ordered 
for all Armenian soldiers serving in the Ottoman army to be disarmed and sent to the labour 
battalions. Later, during the year that the Ottomans entered the war, the war minister ordered for all 
of these innocent Armenians, roughly 200,000 in amount, to be killed (Karsh & Karsh 132). 
Although these Armenians that died at the hands of Enver were not women or children or elderly, 
they were still innocent as the pasha had taken away any chances of them being able to defend 
themselves from the massacres. It is difficult to understand why the war minister, among all 
figures, would eliminate a large sum of men willing to fight in the war when he needed as much as 
he could fighting off the Russians to the east and even more to the west. However, if there was a 
hint of suspicion that these Armenians would betray, as mentioned before, one might, even if they 
do not agree with the actions, be able to understand his logic. And as we have seen, there was more 
than enough to fuel any kind of suspicion coming from this group since the time of Abdul Hamid’s 
reign. 
 
DEPORTATIONS & COMPARISON WITH YUGOSLAVIA 
 Benjamin Liebeman starts out his work by addressing the elephant in the room: labeling the 
conflict known to many scholars a genocide, as an ethnic cleansing. He writes that this different 
label has stirred up much controversy because this new label, ethnic cleansing, could be used as a 
euphemism to cover up violence or to make it seem not as serious. However, since the end of the 
20th century, the term has come to gain more support especially in describing the conflicts that 
revolved within Yugoslavia’s borders in the 1990’s (Bloxham & Moses 43). 
According to Liebeman, the Commission of Experts appointed by the UN Security Council 
reported in 1993 that the issues arising in the former states of Yugoslavia could be best described 
as ethnic cleansing. As is identical to the term’s definition, what happened in Yugoslavia was the 
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removal of specific groups from a chosen region by way of either force or intimidation in order to 
maintain an ethnically homogenous presence in the area. The author goes more in detail as to state 
how these methods of force and intimidation were carried out. Such methods included murder, 
torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, rape and other sexual assaults, and deportation against 
civilians (44). 
In terms of applying force to a group in order for their removal, there is not much difference 
between the two terms genocide and ethnic cleansing. Where these terms differ is when geography 
gets involved. In my analysis of the two definitions, the former focuses on consequences and the 
latter on the function of the action. Ethnic cleansing refers to only the removal of peoples from a 
certain region as I stated before in the Yugoslavia example. It is a recreation of a human landscape 
through forced means. The terms also specifically apply to peoples living in border or conflicted 
areas containing a mixed population, much like the Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims living 
amongst each other in Yugoslavia. Lieberman states the very case that gave rise to the term’s 
emergence came from the Serbian forces attacking other ethnic groups within their borders in order 
to maintain a homogeneous Greater Serbia, and that would thus lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia 
(44). 
Although ethnicity and/or religion do play a big role in dividing the groups, they are seen as 
insignificant when it comes to perpetrating the conflicts. Liebeman argues that these background 
factors are less important than the relationships between perpetrators and their victims. The conflict 
arises if these relationships are not positive and the former group senses a potential threat coming 
from the latter (44). 
I will be going more in depth about deportations because I believe that it is this factor that 
distinguishes between the events of 1993 Yugolsavia and the ones of World War I Ottoman 
Empire. Liebeman writes how even this more specific term, deportation, can be labeled in 
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numerous ways. It may be argued as a forced migration for one event, and a population transfer for 
another. In an organized manner, population transfers are agreed upon by states/nations regarding 
the exchange of particular groups across lands controlled by different authorities. Since there is 
always the risk of retaliation by the opposing party, these transfers would produce a less violent 
way of interaction than the forced migration. The author writes of how the Ottoman Empire, since 
its early years had implemented a system called surgun in which Ottoman authorities would 
periodically move Muslim populations in order to strengthen the Turkish border within its 
European domain. These relocations were designed in a strategic way to create a more loyal 
population under the reigning sultan. Liebeman writes that quite the opposite of World War I 
happened after the capture of Constantinople where the sultan at the time, Mehmed II used forced 
migration in order to bring more outsiders and non-Muslims into the city and thus diversify his new 
capital (48). 
 
WERE THE ARMENIANS VICTIMS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING OR GENOCIDE? 
Although what has been stated so far in the definitions of ethnic cleansing could very easily 
be applied to the Armenians, especially the role of ethnicity and the threat that comes with it, it is 
here in the population displacements that I would argue sets the stage for labeling what happened 
to the Armenians as a genocide. It was not a population transfer as the only group that was being 
displaced from their homes were the Christian Armenians. As it was not population transfer, it was 
also not a method of ethnic cleansing at least in the way Liebeman explains the term. I argue this 
on the grounds that a high death rate was expected upon the victims and yet the order was still 
carried out by the Ottoman government. Liebeman writes, “When high mortality through 
deportation or expulsion is predictable, intended, and expected, it makes sense to refer to genocide 
rather than ethnic cleansing or to both ethnic cleansing and genocide” (45).  
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As stated before in this paper, the perpetrating officials who were responsible for ordering 
the hundreds of thousands of Armenians’ displacement to the south and west were well aware of 
the many dangers that these deportees would face along their journeys. Aside from the obvious 
factors of starvation, disease, and hypothermia, the government was well aware of the dangers 
surrounding the Muslim bandits’ hatred of their Christian neighbors, hatred arguably fueled by the 
government itself in addition to the consequences of the Armenian revolutionaries.  
Ethnic cleansing quite simply seeks the removal of an unwanted group, whereas genocide 
seeks their entire elimination. What I write here does not agree with either statement in its entirety. 
There is a thin line between the two that the events of World War I Eastern Ottoman Empire fall 
into. It is up to the reader of my paper to pick a side as to decide whether this was an act of 
removing the Armenians for theirs and their neighbor Muslims’ safety, an act of getting rid of them 
in order to keep a homogenous Turkish population within the borders, or something else. What I 
argue here is not so much what the intention of the Ottoman government was, but the process in 
which they executed their plans. Even if they thought about the safety of the Armenians because of 
their conflicted location between the Turks and the Russians, they did not take into account their 
safety and did not ensure them a guaranteed success wherever they were displaced to. The act of 
ignoring the facts on what might happen during these forced migrations  in addition to all that 
transpired between the groups during the late 19th century and early 20th, either at the hands of 
Abdul Hamid, the CUP regime, or locals, is why I believe the Ottoman government was 
responsible for committing genocide, arguably, the first genocide of the century. Yes it may be 
argued that these deportees were sent to the southern regions of the empire like Syria and Iraq to 
ensure their own safety, however, they did not receive any humanitarian assistance nor were they 
provided the sufficient facilities and supplies that would have been vital in their survival in the long 
path they were forced to travel (Travis 219). 
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 Writing that CUP members flat out ordered the execution of thousands or more Armenians 
is the very tip of the iceberg for Lewy. He delves into the history behind why Ottomans perpetrated 
the acts, they are to this day, assumed to have done.  
 
ROOT OF THE TERM, GENOCIDE 
Guenter Lewy concentrates on the events of the Great War themselves however without 
going too much into picking sides as to argue if it was a genocide or not. He points out that 
recognition of the genocide would be proving if there was in fact true intent from higher powers in 
letting it happen. Did Sultan Abdul Hamid II as well as the Young Turk regime truly organize and 
engineer such massacres that resulted in a genocide during World War I? This question of intent, 
according to Lewy, would define the larger question of whether or not it could be called the 
Armenian Genocide or more vaguely, the Armenian Massacres. Going back to the definitions of 
the term given by the likes of Lemkin and Shaw, for an act to be registered as such, it would have 
to have been orchestrated by the government and/or authorities in charge, otherwise, it would be no 
different than a bunch of rogue activities performed by outraged and possibly brainwashed civilians 
and soldiers.  
 Lewy admits that both sides came to an agreement that many Christians, among which the 
majority of whom were of Armenian descent, perished either from the massacres or the forced 
deportations. “Several hundred thousand men, women, and children were forced from their homes 
with hardly any notice; and during a harrowing trek over mountains and through deserts uncounted 
multitudes died of starvation and disease or were murdered” (ix). This is where I agree with 
Lewy’s philosophy. He does not put more emphasis on intent as creating the basis for genocide as 
other scholars have done but focuses on the mistakes performed by the government that could have 
caused the genocide to appear from a different perspective. It is the fact that these people died that 
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the government was at fault. Whether or not the deportations were organized to serve the purpose 
of protecting the civilians or flat out annihilating them, the result was one and the same; thousands 
of innocent lives passed away. 
 The reason for my calling it specifically the first genocide of the 20th century stems from 
how the term came to be. Raphael Lemkin coined the term, and he got his influence from none 
other than the events that transpired between the Ottomans and the Armenians. Lemkin wrote: 
“Sovereignty… cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions (debatable number) of innocent 
people… I didn’t know all the answers but I felt that a law against this type of racial and religious 
murder must be adopted by the world.” (Preface) After educating himself on the history of the 
Ottomans during World War I, Lemkin came up with the term widely used today through his prior 
knowledge of Greek and Latin. “Genos” meaning family or race in Greek, and “cide” meaning 
killing in Latin became an appropriate fit in his mind. According to the lawyer, all kinds of 
destructive anti-group acts were seen as belonging to the same class and thereby criminalized.  
 In coming up with the term, Lemkin wanted to focus not only on the barbarity of the 
violence but also the economic destruction and persecution connected to it. In addition to the 
Armenians, Lemkin was galvanized by Winston Churchill’s statement regarding the Nazi 
Genocide: “We are in the presence of a crime without a name” (Vasel 1053).  
 He coined the term as a result, some 30 years after what had happened to the Armenians 
during World War I. This however did not catch on immediately and did not evolve into what we 
understand of it today until the end of the 20th century. The big factor was the Cold War. After 
tensions between USA and the USSR cooled down, thus soothing with it a large chunk of the 
world’s nations, world politics opened up more to human rights concerns therefore legal 
institutions actually began to try genocide cases (Shaw Intro). 
37  
Martin Shaw agrees with Lemkin’s philosophy that there should be a general concept to 
describe all targeted destructions of population groups. At the same time however, there are 
complications he finds in Lemkin’s term being applied to that of the Armenians.  
Firstly, Shaw criticises Lemkin’s credibility. This is a valid critique as Raphael Lemkin 
however distinguished of a lawyer he was, lacked the appropriate training in order to be a social 
theoretician. His framework was also an insufficiently developed reflection of some common ideas 
of his time. According to Shaw, even his terminology of “genos” within “genocide” had problems 
(Intro).  
Secondly, the nature of history and our perception of it evolving played a key factor. Shaw, 
in addition to his critiques of Lemkin, states that even if the latter had the right idea, his theories are 
not the same as when they originated. Once the term escaped its inventor, the meaning slowly but 
steadily began to change (Intro). 
For many writers on the subject, genocide has come to mean little more than mass murder. 
According to Shaw, there is one common misinterpretation that McCarthy also touched on; 
genocide can be practiced in times of peace as well as war. Shaw rejects this idea for the basis that 
this statement negates the deep connections of genocide and war, and therefore cannot hold true. 
Shaw’s attitude toward this statement fuels the argument that there was a genocide against the 
Armenians since it took place at the very middle of the war’s timeline, however it also gives an 
understanding of how the Turks did not just commit the capital crime in random during peace when 
it was unneccessary. “Moreover, understanding the structure of genocide as conflict must be 
complimented by understanding the larger structural contexts in which this kind of conflict arises” 
(Intro). In labeling it as genocide, one must take into account the strucutral contexts which includes 
subjective orientations of the actors and their objective causes. The structural contexts mentioned 
here could in sum be explained by the previously written Justin McCarthy’s narrative.  
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COMPARISON WITH THE HOLOCAUST 
 How was the Armenian Genocide different than what had transpired in Nazi Germany that 
Churchill requested a label for it? Although every committed genocide has a reasoning behind it, 
whether it’d be logical or not, the way it is moved forward differs. Shaw states that calling it 
genocide does not mean just calling it destruction, especially not an immediate one that of a nation. 
According to him, it is designed in the form of a coordinated plan including different actions 
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with additional aim 
of annihilating the group themselves.  
  According to him, this same definition can be compared to that of the Holocaust. Movies 
and other popular platforms of the media have portrayed this event at least in recent years in a very 
common theme; the minorities’ fear for their lives, forced separation from their loved ones, the 
brutal inhumane acts at concentration camps, and so on. However, it was much more than that. 
There were many steps taken by the regime to attack in all aspects of life the Jewish, Polish, Slavic 
populations as well as the peoples who identified with the LGBTQ community or had physical 
and/or intellectual disabilities (Schwartz). They imposed a strictly German pattern of 
administration and destroyed institutions of self-government. They prohibited and destroyed 
cultural institutions, activities, and traditions. The Nazi regime did so, again according to an 
enhanced long-term plan, by replacing education within the liberal arts with vocational education, 
thus limiting, or even preventing, any kind of humanistic thinking. There arose a promotion of 
Germanism by a policy of depopulation and procreating of Germans in occupied countries. For the 
minorities stated before, there began a starvation rationing system. Basically, if you were a non-
German, food was a luxury. Even if one were to leave all of the killings aside, this in itself would 
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be enough to justify the act as genocide because the government would have already established 
total control of their targeted populations and used it to their advantage in eliminating them. 
 
THE CIRCASSIAN GENOCIDE 
 This term “genocide” was also labeled to describe the events that took place during the 19th 
century to the natives of the Caucasus before the Armenian Genocide happened. Walter Richmond 
goes into depth in explaining the controversial term through narrating other people’s history. 
Although the title he gives his work writes Circassians, he more so writes on the suffering of the 
groups around them as well, such as the Kabardians. I will focus on this group in this writing. 
  I will summarize and analyze Richmond’s content on the Kabardians’ suffering during the 
Circassian Genocide for the same reason I gave a brief summary of what the Nazi Genocide 
included, in order to later compare and contrast it to that of the Armenian one. Through this will I 
be able to present a better understanding of the Armenian Genocide and pit the history in a broader 
context.  
 In coming back to labeling the term, Richmond speaks of Georgia’s take on the events that 
transpired. The parliament of the nation of Georgia passed a resolution in 2011 defining what 
happened in their lands at the hands of the Russians during the 19th century as genocide. 
According to Richmond, the resolution stated; “genocide… is the preplanned mass killing of 
Circassians by the Russian Imperial Army in the 1860’s” (1). However, as I have stated in this 
paper and as I have shown how Martin Shaw criticised this topic, genocide is not as simple as 
seeing a mass killing done onto a group. There has always been added other elements regarding 
firstly, the reasoning behind such an act, the systematic approach leading up to the event, and what 
else occurred that could be considered threatening one group’s existence.  
40  
 After reading on the history of the Circassians’ relations with Russia, I can justifiably write 
that the aforementioned genocide was not solely seen in the 1860s. Arguably, it is that time period 
when it all ended. In fact, everything leading up to the events of 1864 (the date agreed by historians 
as the year of genocide) and beyond started in the mid 18th century. It is coming back to this date 
that I refer back to my previous statement, that it would be wrong to just limit the victims to 
Circassians, as a large chunk of other Caucassians suffered as well.  
 As I have narrated the background behind the Armenian Genocide through the knowledge 
of Justin McCarthy, I will do the same for the Circassian one through the knowledge of Walter 
Richmond. Although I will not refer to the history from where Richmond starts off, primarily 
because he sets out his writing from the second millennium BCE, a date that does not coincide with 
the genocide, I will refer to the century when feuds with Russia initially started leading up to the 
1864 events.  
 Approximately a century earlier during Catherine the Great’s reign is an ideal place to start. 
It was then in the 1760s that the Russian empress set out to conquer the northeastern shores of the 
Black Sea in what is now Georgia and Southwestern Russia. “The Russian military worked to hem 
in the Circassians bit by bit until they [the latter] were surrounded in the high mountains” 
(Richmond 8). 
 Even in the succession of Catherine II, when the same mindset might not have been carried 
as the empress, emperors such as Paul I and Alexander I made their decisions regarding the dealing 
with these lands based on the limited and possibly biased information they received from their 
advisors and commanders of the region. By the 1820s, the vast majority of the natives in those 
lands, a majority of them the Kabardians, had either been killed or expelled into Western Circassia. 
Here they continued to fight until the very end, which came some four decades later. During this 
time period, commanders from Alexei Ermolov in the 1820s to Nikolai Evdokimov in the 1860s 
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consistently misled St. Petersburg, the capital of Tsar Russia, about the whereabouts of the 
situation and kept pursuing an agenda in which they would deliberately sabotage any policies that 
would have led to a peaceful conclusion in the conflict (17).  
 One such commander in addition to the previously mentioned was Sergei Bulgakov. The 
tsar’s newly appointed general as commander of the Caucasus Line turned the plague of his day 
(possibly malaria or typhus) to his advantage in dealing with the Caucassian natives. What was 
supposed to be for quarantine purposes between Russia and the Caucasus evolved to be a complete 
economic blockade of Kabardia that threatened the tribe with extinction. “His blockade of 
Kabardia wasn’t only to stop the spread of the plague but to physically crush the Kabardians into 
complete submission” (Richmond 14). Richmond writes that this strategy would be used again and 
again by the likes of Bulgakov and his successors, conquest through starvation, a method 
mentioned multiple times previously in this paper.  
 Bulgakov as well as the other commanders of the area were not just responsible for thinking 
in such an inhumane way but actually carrying out just the same inhumane acts. Through them, 
Russia would go on to burn down villages, destroy fortifications, and seize tens of thousands of 
livestock from the Kabardians all in an effort to annihilate them without directly killing them, or at 
least force them to come to peace conditions dictated by the empire. As a result, and as one may 
also see similarities within the framework of the Armenian Genocide, thousands of lives were lost 
due to a combination of factors including starvation, disease, and lack of shelter.   
The Russian defense minister of the time, Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly, did not agree 
with Bulgakov’s actions. He wrote; “Various rumors have reached us that cause [the Emperor] to 
conclude that in pacifying the rebels, General Bulgakov’s use of exorbitant degrees of brutality and 
inhumanity went beyond the limits of his responsibility. If one believes the reports, the expeditions 
against the Kabardians and the Kuban mountaineers consisted of the absolute plunder and burning 
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of their homes; these brutal actions, which have driven those people to the brink of despair, have 
only aroused their hatred for us, and his dealings with the neighboring peoples have served more to 
create loathing of us than establish peace in that region” (Richmond 16). 
This is comparable to what we will see later in this paper on the policies of both Abdul 
Hamid and the CUP regime in Ottoman internal affairs concerning the Armenians. Both histories, 
the Circassians and the Armenians, highlight one logical notion. These groups, however agitated 
they might have been in their dreams of establishing a free state for their countrymen, did not act 
on them until after their presiding governments allowed the situations to come to that point. 
This became the case later as Richmond writes, when tensions between the Russian Empire 
and the North Caucasus escalated in the mid 19th century. Up until the 1860’s peaceful protests by 
the Circassian community were always met with Russian raids into Circassia in an effort to sow 
animosity. Again, similar to Ottoman efforts, Armenians were constantly suppressed and even 
punished for expressing themselves as well. These actions taken by the Russian government, 
combined with the fact that field commanders would not relay complete honest evaluations back to 
St. Petersburg directly led to the pinnacle of events that transpired in 1864 (17). 
All such peacemakers among the Circassian community were a major threat and the 
Russian military thwarted all such efforts. The notion that the Circassians simply wanted to become 
neighbors and not subjects of the Czar quickly died out and a different belief emerged as a 
consequence of all the protesting: the only acceptable form of peace for the Russians would come 
from an unconditional surrender by the Circassians or their complete and utter elimination 
(Richmond 18). 
The reason for why Russia did not allow for Circassian peacemakers to make their stamp 
was because they thought of themselves as the true peacemakers. In their minds, it was the 
Caucasus people who were the barbarians and who needed to be enlightened by the Russians in 
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topics of peace and prosperity. Nikolai Ermolov was one such figure who operated on the basis that 
Russians were in fact doing a service to the Circassians. Richmond writes quite sarcastically here 
that Ermolov was cruel, but cruel in the name of enlightenment, “He shot and hanged people, 
sometimes by their feet, in the name of progress for this edge of the empire, for its people” 
(Richmond 19). 
Richmond does not specify this popular notion of “enlightening” a group seen as a potential 
threat to only the Russians. Numerous more advanced and civilized states have committed the same 
trickery in history, among all the British and other powerhouses of Europe. Whenever they would 
come into contact with, as they identified, savage or even “semi-savage” races, they would take 
and/or control by force a portion of the latter’s land so as a way to slowly, gradually start giving up 
any urge of resistance (20). One may argue that this “savage” label might have even been placed 
upon the Armenians by the Ottomans. 
Saying that the Russians were liberators and that they only meant to enlighten the 
barbarians was easier than saying they did not have the power to do the same with powerful states 
for figures like Ermolov, who wrote; “We can’t take a step into Europe without a fight, but in Asia 
entire kingdoms are at our service” (21). This was merely a strategy implemented in fighting the 
opponents that gave the Russians the highest chance of success, as compared to the West, the 
Caucasus were powerless in combat against the all powerful empire.  
Ermolov’s goal was the assimilation of the native peoples from the Caucasus. However 
plain this might have seemed, it was far from it. He wanted to remove all obstacles in the way as a 
means of reaching the southern regions of the Caucasus. Although the north lacked material benefit 
to the empire, their geographic location made up for it. Russia’s ultimate desire was expanding into 
India but also controlling Iran and its surrounding areas (Richmond 22). The empire could not get 
to its mission target without first getting rid of the blockade in the north.  
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Ermolov, much like his predecessor Bulgakov, implemented harsh acts upon the Caucasus 
peoples. He used the plague to his advantage in ridding the region of its native people and where 
disease had not killed them, Ermolov came in to “finish the job” (Richmond 26). Those who 
survived the attacks by Ermovlov’s army were forced to migrate down to the lowlands during the 
winter season where a great deal of them died due to cold temperatures. According to the author, 
the Kabardian lowlands would reach temperatures of below zero.   
 According to Richmond, up until the official date of genocide, 1864, it could be said that 
Bulgakov as well as Ermolov used tactics that were considered to produce the first unofficial 
genocide in the region. Similarly to the Ottoman Armenians’ story, what they experienced at the 
hands of Abdul Hamid could also have been called genocide in addition to the events they 
experienced during World War I. Richmond, in backing up his claim that genocide might have 
been labeled earlier than it had been, provides his own interpretation and knowledge of the term…   
“Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group” (Richmond 28). 
Coming back to Ermolov specifically (although some of these key points reflect Bulgakov’s 
actions as well), it can be argued that he and his men violated all five of these categories on several 
occasions. He killed innocent natives. He terrorized the population through methods like stealing 
their resources and burning their homes. He forced migration onto the people whom he knew 
would not stand a chance against the harsh winter conditions. He separated children from their 
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families and sent them to orphanages, or if their age was appropriate, to serve in the Imperial 
Army.  
 The Russian Imperial Army did to Kabardians during the mid 19th century what the 
Ottomans did to Armenians in the late 19th century. They both started with terrorizing the minority 
group who were unable to defend themselves. They became a flat out massacring campaign after 
tensions escalated between the two groups. In the end, those who survived were forced to migrate 
down south in inhumane conditions. These mass migrations led the Northern Caucassians to end up 
in the Ottoman Empire and they are the reason that so many of them currently live in the nation of 
Turkey. They also however led the Armenians to migrate away from their homes and this is the 
reason why there is such an absence of their population in Eastern Anatolia today. 
 
DADRIAN- TRIALS AFTER WWI 
One might argue that the issues we face today on whether or not we accept or deny the 
genocide started in the aftermath of the Great War. Vahakn Dadrian has been an outspoken 
supporter of the Armenian case and so I wanted to incorporate his work among the works of Jay 
Winter and Hovanisian as a way of countering the many authors who I have listed that could be 
argued would be on the Turkish side. Dadrian writes that even among the post-war Turkish 
government, multiple voices were raised in protest of all that transpired. There were demands that 
all those who were responsible for the inhumanistic wartime treatment of the Armenians be 
condemned. In the words that Dadrian used, as well as others before him, the Ottoman Empire had 
committed “crimes against humanity” (61-70).  
Dadrian also mentions that the sultan, who had the highest authority at the time, uses these 
words exactly in denouncing the crimes committed by his own empire. The exact translation the 
author puts is as follows; “Kanuni insaniyete karai ika edilen ceraim” (62). Although the sultan 
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himself condemning an act that represents the barbarity of his own people is courageous, Dadrian 
is inaccurate when stating that the sultan had the highest authority. In the immediate aftermath of 
the war, Dadrian can only be referring to Mehmed VI. For exactly a decade since Mehmed 
inherited the throne, the sultanate office did not carry its absolute power as it had for the majority 
of the empire’s history. After the 1908 revolution and reestablishment of the first constitution, the 
sultan had to share power now with a system of multiple political parties, the Parliament, and 
General Assembly (72). 
In the Yozgat Court-Martial verdict, those who were condemned as being responsible for 
these acts were accused of violating the principle of “human sentiment.” The grand vizier of the 
time described this atrocity as “making humanity and the civilized world shudder forever” (Dadrian 
62). 
Most of these accusations repeat the same theme over and over again, that these acts were 
not humane and morally wrong. Dadrian skews away from these talks and writes, arguably more 
controversially, the difference between what the Armenians did to the Muslims and what the Turks 
did back to the Armenians after a post-war Turkish senator commented that they were the same. 
Facing this comment, Dadrian explains that what the Armenians did in revolt were acted upon by 
individuals in retaliation for the empire-wide massacres, whereas the Turks acted as a government 
in acting out those massacres. This is Dadrian’s main argument that although the Armenian 
revolutionaries were by no means innocent, it was the Turkish brutality that enacted them to get 
their revenge in a similar way (62-63). 
What Dadrian writes however coincides with many of the authors whom I listed in this 
paper such as Lewy. Where Dadrian writes that the Muslim massacres were an individual effort, 
Lewy opposes and states that what gathered and gave way to these individuals were the 
organizations of the Hunchak and Dashnak parties. The difference here would be that the 
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Armenians acted from political parties whereas the Turks acted from the government, but the 
Armenians had no government to start with in order to make this comparison. 
 
TURKISH EDUCATION ON THE ISSUE 
According to the ANCA, Armenian Committee of America, in a research conducted toward 
the beginning of the 2000’s, the Turkish government drastically escalated its campaign of denying 
the events of World War I by creating a mandate that all schools within the Turkish education 
system teach its students to also deny them. By “denying,” I mean here of not holding true that the 
Armenian Genocide ever happened, and understanding the Armenian’ side as an attack on their 
country/pride (Chouldjian). 
 Huseyin Celik, minister of education at the time issued a decree that stated all schools must 
“utilize their resources to combat ‘Armenian claims.’ as well as deny that the Turkish government 
ordered actions against them.” He does not leave it to only the Armenians as being the perpetrators 
of these claims as he defends his nation from committing any crimes against all minority non-
Christian groups including the Greeks and the Assyrians during the beginning of the 20th century. 
Celik justified his actions of dismissing the death of, according to ANCA, 1.5 million Armenians, 
by referring to a narrative that could come straight out of one of Justin McCarthy’s works, “Upon 
betrayal of rebellious Armenians who collaborated with the enemy, the Ottoman State was obliged 
to take a decision on May 27, 1915, on relocation of the Armenian population from the war zone to 
southern regions of the Empire for the safety of the army and its supply routes” (Chouldjian). 
 In lieu of this, school administrators would bring in experts about the issue. They would 
train the teachers who would be conveying this material to their students, the experts, stated by the 
ANCA authors as “being trained themselves to deny the facts about the Armenian Genocide.” Just 
like all learned material, students would be tested in it as well. (Chouldjian).  
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 As unethical as this may all seem, it is not the first time that a country has interfered in its 
respective education in hopes of promoting some kind of nationalism. I have attended high school 
in both the Republic of Turkey as well as the United States of America. Where I can truthfully 
admit that what this article states is correct, and that I have not been educated while in Turkey on 
the Armenians’ suffering during the late-19th and early-20th centuries, I can also admit that I was 
never educated on the Native Amercians’ suffering at the hands of the Americans during the mid-
19th century, a reference to the Trail of Tears and similar events. (Chouldjian).   
 
KATCHAZNOUNI- AFTERMATH 
The English translator, Matthew Callender, writes that since this work of Katchaznouni was 
published in 1927, “Western powers'' have continued increasing pressure on Turkey. The West has 
pushed forth as an agenda that as the Ottoman Empire’s successor state, Turkey should admit 
responsibility on the Armenian Genocide. Callender, much like what I focus on in this paper, does 
not think this label is as important as what it brings about to outside powers. He writes, “whether 
what happened in 1914-1923 was ‘genocide’ or self defense of an empire which was being pulled 
apart is not what really interests the ‘Western powers.’ It is propaganda.” He lays out his belief in 
the very beginning even before translating Katchaznouni’s words that no matter what truthfully 
happened in those years, the west will come up with any means necessary to alter the public view 
about Turkey and its internal affairs. They would do so in order to control the strategic location in 
hopes of opening the road beyond the country into the Middle East’s oil, gas and other valuable 
resources. This is a much more complex topic than what I write it out to be here in a few sentences, 
however Callender explains it very briefly that it is mostly a matter of which side is backed up by 
more financial power and thus, which side that opposes them is seen as the victims of propaganda 
(26).  
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 Callender also addresses the claims about the CUP’s intentions argued by Armenian 
Genocide recognizer Taner Akcam whom I cited earlier. The focus is on whether or not Talaat 
Pasha was in fact guilty for allowing an extreme nationalistic urge take over his actions and result 
in the “purging” in Anatolia of non-Turkish ethnicities (3, 26).  
 Mehmet Perincek, one of the more passionate advocates who has defended the genocide 
denial side, makes it clear in his Turkish translated version of the work that Katchaznouni’s words 
were very powerful and threatening to the Armenian community. He states that copies of the book 
were removed from all over Europe at the hands of the remaining Dashnags. Although this does 
seem likely and other countries have shown to do the same thing, there is no credible source that 
Perincek lists which proves his point (7). 
 As much as Dadrian looks to all of the points that help his readers solely recognize the 
genocide, Perincek does so that helps his readers only recognize that those former scholars are 
liars. It is because of scholars like these, in addition to most of the ones I have cited earlier, that we 
have such a black and white view of the events; it is either genocide or it isn’t. I have tried to rid 
myself of any kind of biases that I have had of the situation and even read for the most part from a 
non-Turkish point of view so that I may truthfully call it for what it is. Very plainly, there was a 
genocide that occurred in the later years of the Ottoman Empire. What I point out, although it does 
not undermine the Ottoman government’s crime against humanity, is that the situation became 
inescapable with decades of tensions escalating prior. Where I lean my argument is that the 
genocide was a product not of true intention, but a consistency of mistakes and an inabiity to 
provide security for the victims. These mistakes came from the highest levels ranging from the 
time of Abdul Hamid II to the CUP’s triumvirate leaders. The genocide was in total, a combination 
of the mistreatments of the Armenian population, the Hamidian Massacres, the 1915 massacres, 




Akcam, Taner. Shameful Act. 1st ed., Picador Paper, 2007. 
Alkan, Mehmet Öznur. "Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Seçimlerin Kısa Tarihi.”  
Wayback Machine, 1999. 
Balakian, Peter. The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response. Harper 
Perennial, 2004. 
Bloxham, Donald, and Dirk Moses. The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (Oxford 
Handbooks). 1st ed., Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Bozdag, Ismet. Sultan Abdülhamid’in Hatira Defteri. Truva Yayinlari, 2021. 
Cleveland, William, and Martin Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. 6th ed., Routledge, 
2016. 
Dadrian, Vahakn. The Armenian Genocide as a Dual Problem of National and International Law. 
Amsterdam-Netherlands, Netherlands, Amsterdam University Press, 2010. 
Deringil, Selim. “‘The Armenian Question Is Finally Closed’: Mass Conversions of Armenians in 
Anatolia during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895–1897.” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, vol. 51, no. 2, 2009, pp. 344–71. Crossref, doi:10.1017/s0010417509000152. 
Gokalp, Ziya. “Turan.” Antoloji.com, Accessed 5 January 2021.  
Hurewitz, J. C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record: 1535-1914 &  
1914-1956. J. C. Hurewitz, 1987. 
51  
Ihrig, Stefan. Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler. Harvard 
University Press, 2016. 
Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Karsh. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 
1789-1923. Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Kʻajaznuni, Hovhannēs, and Akalın. Dashnagtzoutiun Has Nothing to Do Anymore. Kaynak 
Yayınları, 2007. 
Kieser, Hans-Lukas. Talaat Pasha: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide. Princeton 
University Press, 2020. 
Kinross, Lord. The Ottoman Centuries The Rise and Fall of The Turkish Empire. William Morrow 
& Company, 1977. 
Langer, William. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902. 2nd ed., Knopf, 2021. 
Lepsius-J. Le Rapport Secret Du Dr. Johannès Lepsius, Sur Les Massacres d’Arménie (Litterature) 
(French Edition). HACHETTE LIVRE-BNF, 2018. 
Lewy, Guenter. The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Utah Series 
in Turkish and Islamic Stud). 1st ed., University of Utah Press, 2007. 
Lieberman, Benjamin. Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe. 
Illustrated, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013. 
McCarthy, Justin. The Armenian Rebellion at Van (Utah Series in Turkish and Islamic Stud). 1st 
ed., University of Utah Press, 2006. 
52  
“Prof Justin McCarthy, Melbourne Symposium: ‘What Happened During 1915-1919?’” YouTube, 
uploaded by ATA-A, 7 Dec. 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPcNuu3jJWk. 
Rae, Heather. State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples (Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations, Series Number 84). Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Richmond, Walter. The Circassian Genocide (Genocide, Political Violence, Human Rights). None, 
Rutgers University Press, 2013. 
Rodogno, Davide. Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-
1914 (Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity). Reprint, Princeton University Press, 
2015. 
Schaller, Dominik, and Jürgen Zimmerer. Late Ottoman Genocides. 1st ed., Routledge, 2009. 
Schwartz, Terese Pencak, et al. Holocaust Forgotten - Five Million Non-Jewish Victims (Volume 
1). CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012. 
Shaw, Martin. What Is Genocide? 2nd ed., Polity, 2015. 
Shaw, Stanford, and Ezel Kural Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 
2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975. 1st ed., 
Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
Travis, Hannibal. Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and Sudan. 1st ed., 
Carolina Academic Press, 2010. 
Vasel, Johann Justus. “‘In the Beginning, There Was No Word ….’” European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 29, no. 4, 2018, pp. 1053–56. Crossref, doi:10.1093/ejil/chy087. 
53  
Wilson, Mary Christina. King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge Middle 
East Library). Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Winter, Jay. America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 (Studies in the Social and Cultural 
History of Modern Warfare). 1st ed., Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
